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Abstract
Coarse correlation models strategic interactions
of rational agents complemented by a correlation
device, that is a mediator that can recommend be-
havior but not enforce it. Despite being a classical
concept in the theory of normal-form games for
more than forty years, not much is known about
the merits of coarse correlation in extensive-form
settings. In this paper, we consider two instantia-
tions of the idea of coarse correlation in extensive-
form games: normal-form coarse-correlated equi-
librium (NFCCE), already defined in the litera-
ture, and extensive-form coarse-correlated equi-
librium (EFCCE), which we introduce for the
first time. We show that EFCCE is a subset of
NFCCE and a superset of the related extensive-
form correlated equilibrium. We also show that, in
two-player extensive-form games, social-welfare-
maximizing EFCCEs and NFCEEs are bilinear
saddle points, and give new efficient algorithms
for the special case of games with no chance
moves. In our experiments, our proposed algo-
rithm for NFCCE is two to four orders of magni-
tude faster than the prior state of the art.
1. Introduction
As a generic term, correlated equilibrium denotes a family
of solution concepts whereby a mediator that can recom-
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mend behavior but not enforce it complements the inter-
action of fully rational agents. Before the game starts, a
mediator—also called a correlation device—samples a tuple
of normal-form plans (one for each player) from a publicly
known correlated distribution. He or she then proceeds
to privately ask to each player whether they would like to
commit to playing according to the plan that was sampled
for them. Being an equilibrium, the correlated distribution
must be such that no player has benefit in not following the
recommendations, assuming all other players follow. As
argued by Ashlagi et al. (2008), correlated equilibrium is
a good candidate to model strategic interactions in which
intermediate forms of centralized control can be achieved.
In the context of extensive-form (that is, sequential) games,
two different instantiations of the idea of correlated equilib-
rium are well-known in the literature: normal-form corre-
lated equilibrium (NFCE) (Aumann, 1974; Gilboa & Zemel,
1989) and extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) (von
Stengel & Forges, 2008). The two solution concepts differ
in what the mediator reveals to the players. In an NFCE,
the mediator privately reveals to each player, just before the
game starts, the (whole) normal-form plan that was sampled
for them. Players are then free to either play according to
the plan, or play any other strategy that they desire. In an
EFCE the mediator does not reveal the whole plan to the
players before the game starts. Instead, he or she incremen-
tally reveals the plan by recommending individual moves.
Each recommended move is only revealed when the player
reaches the decision point for which the recommendation is
relevant. Each player is free to play a move different than
the recommended one, but doing so comes at the cost of
future recommendations, as the mediator will immediately
stop issuing recommendations to players that defect. Be-
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cause of this deterrent, and because players have to decide
whether to follow recommendations knowing less about the
sampled normal-form plan than in NFCE, a social-welfare-
maximizing EFCE always achieves social welfare equal or
higher than any NFCE.
Coarse correlated equilibrium differs from correlated equi-
librium in that players must decide whether or not to commit
to playing according to the recommendations of the media-
tor before observing such recommendations. Normal-form
coarse-correlated equilibrium (NFCCE) (Moulin & Vial,
1978) is the coarse equivalent of NFCE. Before the game
starts, players decide whether to commit to playing accord-
ing to the normal-form plan that was sampled by the medi-
ator (from some correlated distribution known to players),
without observing such a plan first. Players who decide to
commit will privately receive the plan that was sampled for
them; players that decide to not commit will not receive any
recommended plan, and are free to play according to any
strategy they desire. Since players know less at the time of
commitment than either NFCE or EFCE, a social-welfare-
maximizing NFCCE is always guaranteed to achieve equal
or higher social welfare than any NFCE or EFCE. No coarse
equivalent of EFCE is currently known in the literature.
In this paper, we introduce the coarse equivalent of EFCE,
which we coin extensive-form coarse-correlated equilibrium
(EFCCE). It is an intermediate solution concept between
EFCE and NFCCE. Specifically, EFCCE is akin to EFCE
in that each recommended move is only revealed when the
players reach the decision point for which the recommenda-
tion is relevant. However, unlike EFCE, the acting player
must choose whether or not to commit to the recommended
move before such a move is revealed to them, instead of
after. Figure 1 shows how EFCCE fits inside of the family
of correlated and coarse-correlated solution concepts.
We prove that EFCCE is always a subset of NFCCE and
a superset of EFCE, and give an example of a game in
which the three solution concepts lead to distinct solution
sets. We also show that the problem of computing a social-
welfare-maximizing EFCCE can be represented as a bilinear
saddle-point, which can be solved in polynomial time in
two-player extensive-form games with no chance moves
but not in games with more than two players or two-player
games with chance moves. Finally, we note that in two-
player games with no chance moves, EFCCE leads to a
linear program whose size is smaller than EFCE; because of
this, EFCCE can also be used as a computationally lighter
relaxation of EFCE—for example, as a routine in the algo-
rithm by Cˇerma´k et al. (2016); Bosˇansky` et al. (2017) for
computing strong Stackelberg equilibrium.
We also show that the problem of computing a social-welfare-
maximizing NFCCE can be expressed as a bilinear saddle-
point problem, which can be solved in polynomial time in
two-player extensive-form games with no chance moves (the
problem is known to be NP-hard in games with more than
two players and/or chance moves). This formulation is sig-
nificant, as it enables several new classes of algorithms to be
employed to compute social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE.
In particular, we show that it enables a linear programming
formulation that in our experiments is two to four orders of
magnitude faster than the prior state of the art.
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Figure 1. Taxonomy of correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Extensive-Form Games
Extensive-form games are played on a game tree, and can
capture both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as
private information. Each node v in the game tree belongs
to exactly one player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∪ {c}. Player c is a
special player called the chance player; it is used to denote
random events that happen in the game, such as drawing
a card from a deck or tossing a coin. The edges leaving v
represent actions that the player can take at that node; we
denote the set of actions available at v as Av. In order to
capture private information, the set of nodes that belong to
each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are partitioned into a collection
Ii of nonempty sets. Each I ∈ Ii is called an information
set of Player i, and is a set of nodes that Player i cannot
distinguish between, given what the player has observed
so far. In this paper, we only consider games with perfect
recall, that is games where no player forgets what he or
she knew earlier. Necessarily, for any I ∈ Ii and u, v ∈ I ,
it must be Au = Av, or otherwise Player i would be able
to distinguish between u and v. For this reason, we will
often write AI to mean the set of available actions at any
node in I , defined as AI := Au for any u ∈ I . Finally,
two information sets Ii, Ij for Player i and j, respectively,
are said to be connected, denoted Ii 
 Ij if there exist
u ∈ Ii, v ∈ Ij such that the path from the root to u passes
through v or vice versa.
Nodes v for whichAv is empty are called leaves, and denote
an end state of the game. We denote the set of leaves of the
2
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game with the symbol Z. Each z ∈ Z is associated with
a tuple of n payoffs (one for each non-chance player); we
denote ui(z) the payoff for Player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} at z.
2.2. Sequences (Σ)
The set of sequences of Player i, denoted Σi, is defined as
the set Σi := {(I, a) : I ∈ Ii, a ∈ AI} ∪ {∅i}, where
the special sequence ∅i is called empty sequence. Given
a node v the belongs to Player 1, the parent sequence of
v, denoted σi(v), is defined as the last sequence (I, a) ∈
Σi encountered on the path from the root to v; if no such
sequence exists (i.e., Player i never acts before v), we let
σi(v) = ∅i. The parent sequence σ(I) of an information
set I ∈ Ii is defined as σ(I) := σ(v) where v is any
node in I (all choices produce the same parent sequence,
since the game is assumed to have perfect recall). Finally,
we introduce the concept of relevant pairs of sequences.
Given two sequences σi and σj for two distinct Player i
and j, respectively, we say that the pair (σi, σj) is relevant
if either one sequence is the empty sequence, or if σi =
(Ii, ai), σj = (Ij , aj) and Ii 
 Ij .
2.3. Reduced-Normal-Form Plans (Π)
A normal-form plan for Player i defines a choice of action
aI ∈ AI for every information set I ∈ Ii of the player.
However, this representation contains irrelevant informa-
tion, as some information sets of Player i may become
unreachable after the player makes certain decisions higher
up the tree. A reduced-normal-form plan pi is a normal-
form plans where this irrelevant information is removed:
it defines a choice of action pi(I) = aI ∈ AI for every
information set I ∈ Ii that is still reachable as a result of
the other choices in pi itself. We denote the set of reduced-
normal-form plans of Player i as Πi. Given a sequence
σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, we denote with Πi(σ) the (sub)set of
reduced-normal-form plans pi that prescribe that Player i
play all actions on the path from the root to any node v ∈ I ,
including playing action a at v. More formally, we let
Πi(∅i) := Πi and recursively for any σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi we
let Πi(σ) := Πi(σi(I)) ∩ {pi ∈ Πi : pi(I) = a}. We will
also make frequent use of the shorthand Πi(z) := Πi(σi(z))
to denote the set of reduced-normal-form plans that allow
Player i to reach leaf z ∈ Z, and Πi(I) := Πi(σi(I)) to de-
note the set of reduced-normal-form plans that allow Player
i to reach information set I ∈ Ii. Finally, a reduced-normal-
form strategy for Player i is a probability distribution over
Πi.
2.4. Polytope of Sequence-Form Strategies (Q)
The sequence-form representation (Romanovskii, 1962; Koller
et al., 1996; von Stengel, 1996) is a more compact way
of representing normal-form strategies of a player in a
perfect-recall extensive-form game. Formally, fix a player
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and let µ be a reduced-normal-form strategy
for Player i, that is some probability distribution over Πi.
The sequence-form strategy induced by µ is the nonnegative
real vector y, indexed over σ ∈ Σi, defined as
y(σ) :=
∑
pi∈Πi(σ)
µ(pi). (1)
The set of sequence-form strategies that can be induced as
µ varies over the set of all possible probability distributions
over Πi is denoted Qi. In particular, Koller et al. (1996)
prove that it is a convex polytope (called the sequence-form
polytope) in R|Σi|+ , described by the affine constraint
Qi = {y ∈ R|Σi|+ : Fiy = fi},
where Fi is a sparse |Ii| × |Σi| matrix with entries in
{0, 1,−1}, and fi is a vector with entries in {0, 1}.
2.5. Polytope of Extensive-Form Correlation Plans (Ξ)
Given any probability distribution µ over×ni=1 Πi in an
extensive-form game, the correlation plan ξ induced by µ is
defined as the real vector, indexed over tuples (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈×ni=1 Σi of pairwise-relevant sequences, where each entry
is
ξ(σ1, . . . , σn) :=
∑
pi1∈Π1(σ1)···
pin∈Πn(σn)
µ(pi1, . . . , pin). (2)
The set of correlation plans ξ that can be induced as µ
varies over the set of all possible probability distributions
is denoted as Ξ and called the polytope of extensive-form
correlation plans. It is always a polytope in a space of
dimension polynomial in the input game description. Fur-
thermore, in two-player games without chance moves, Ξ
can be described as the intersection of a polynomial number
(in the game tree) linear constraints, as shown by von Sten-
gel & Forges (2008). The same authors also prove that this
property does not always hold in games with more than two
players and/or chance moves.
Finally, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, σ ∈ Σi, and z ∈ Z, we
introduce the following notation that we will use often in
the remainder of this paper:
ξi(σ; z) := ξ(σ1(z), . . . , σi−1(z), σ, σi+1(z), . . . , σn(z)).
3. Saddle-Point Formulation of NFCCE
In this section, we show that the problem of computing an
NFCCE that achieves social welfare at least τ (for some
given τ ∈ R) in an n-player extensive-form game with
perfect recall can be expressed as a bilinear saddle-point
problem, that is as an optimization problem of the form
argmin
x∈X
max
y∈Y
x>Ay,
3
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where X and Y are convex and compact sets. In our specific
case, X and Y will be convex polytopes in low-dimensional
spaces (in particular, X = Ξ and Y ⊆ Q1 × · · · × Qn ×
∆n+1). As we will show later, this formulation immediately
implies that in two-player games with no chance moves,
a social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE can be computed in
polynomial time as the solution of a linear program.
We now go through the steps that enable us to formulate the
problem of computing an NFCCE as a bilinear saddle-point
problem. The general structure of the argument is similar to
that of Farina et al. (2019) in the context of EFCE, and we
will use it again later when dealing with EFCCE.
By definition, a correlated distribution µ over×ni=1 Πi is an
NFCCE if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
from the recommended plan assuming that nobody else
does. More formally, let i be any player, and let µˆi be any
probability distribution over Πi, independent of µ. Playing
according to µˆ must give Player i an expected utility uˆi
at most equal to the expected utility ui of committing to
the mediator’s recommendation. In order to express uˆi and
ui as a function of µ and µˆ, it is necessary to quantify the
probability of the game ending in any leaf z ∈ Z. When the
Player deviates and plays according to µˆi, the probability
that the game ends in z is equal to the probability that
the mediator samples a plan pij ∈ Πj(z) for any Player j
other than i, and that Player i samples a plan pii ∈ Πi(z).
Correspondingly, using the independence of µ and µˆi, we
can write
uˆi=
∑
z∈Z
ui(z)
 ∑
pii∈Πi
pij∈Πj(z) ∀j 6=i
µ(pi1, . . . , pin)

 ∑
pii∈Πi(z)
µˆi(pii)

.
On the other hand, the probability that leaf z is reached
when all players commit to the mediator’s recommendation
is equal to the probability that the mediator samples from µ
plans pij ∈ Πj(z) for all players j ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
ui =
∑
z∈Z
ui(z)
 ∑
pij∈Πj(z) ∀j
µ(pi1, . . . , pin)
. (3)
Using the definition of extensive-form correlation plan (2)
and sequence-form strategy (1) we can convert the require-
ment that uˆi ≤ ui for all choices of i and µˆi into the follow-
ing equivalent condition:
Proposition 1. An extensive-form correlation plan ξ ∈ Ξ
is an NFCCE if and only if the following inequality holds
for any player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and sequence-form strategy
yi ∈ Qi:∑
z∈Z
ui(z)ξi(∅i; z)yi(σi(z)) ≤
∑
z∈Z
ui(z)ξi(σi(z); z).
(4)
Inequality (4) is of the form ξ>Aiyi − b>iξ ≤ 0, where Ai
and bi are suitable sparse matrices/vectors that only depend
on i. With this new notation, we can rewrite the condition in
Proposition 1 as follows: ξ ∈ Ξ is an NFCCE if and only if
n
max
i=1
max
yi∈Qi
{
ξ>Aiyi − b>iξ
} ≤ 0
⇐⇒ max
λ∈∆n
yi∈Qi ∀i
{
n∑
i=1
λi
(
ξ>Aiyi − b>iξ
)} ≤ 0
⇐⇒ max
λ∈∆n
y˜i∈λiQi ∀i
{
n∑
i=1
ξ>Aiy˜i − λib>iξ
}
≤ 0, (5)
where in the last transformation we operated a change of
variable y˜i := λiyi; it is a simple exercise to prove that
this change of variable is legitimate and that the domain of
the maximization is a convex polytope. Since an NFCCE
always exists, in particular any ξ such that
ξ ∈ argmin
ξ∈Ξ
max
λ∈∆n
y˜i∈λiQi ∀i
{
n∑
i=1
ξ>Aiy˜i − λib>iξ
}
(6)
is guaranteed to be an NFCCE. Since the domains of the
minimization and maximization problems are both convex
polytopes, and since the objective function is bilinear, the
optimization problem in (6) is a bilinear saddle-point prob-
lem.
3.1. Enforcing a Lower Bound on Social Welfare
Given an NFCCE µ, social welfare is defined as SW :=∑n
i=1 ui, where ui is as in Equation (3). Hence, it is a linear
function of the correlation plan ξ, which can be expressed
as SW : Ξ 3 ξ 7→ c>ξ where c := ∑ni=1 bi. Consequently,
an NFCCE that guarantees a given lower bound τ on the
social welfare can be expressed as in (6) where the domain
of the minimization is changed from ξ ∈ Ξ to ξ ∈ Ξ ∩ {ξ :
c>ξ ≥ τ}. Note that this preserves the polyhedral nature of
the optimization domain.
Finally, the same construction can be used verbatim if social
welfare is replaced with any linear function of ξ.
3.2. Connection to Linear Programming
The saddle-point formulation in (6) can be mechanically
translated into a linear program by taking the dual of the
internal maximization problem, that is of 5. Specifically, the
dual problem is the linear program
(7) :

min u
s.t. u− v>ifi + b>iξ ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
F>i vi −A>iξ ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
u ∈ R,vi ∈ R|Ii| ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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(See the Preliminaries section for the meaning of Fi and
fi). Problem (7) has a polynomial number of variables and
constraints.
By strong duality, the value of (7) is the same as the value of
the primal problem, that is the maximum ‘deviation benefit’
uˆi − ui across all players i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and probability
distributions µˆi over Πi. Hence, we can find an NFCCE
ξ that maximizes any given objective c>ξ by adding the
constraint u ≤ 0 and solving the modified linear program
(8) :

max c>ξ
s.t. u− v>ifi + b>iξ ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
F>i vi −A>iξ ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
u ≤ 0
ξ ∈ Ξ
u ∈ R,vi ∈ R|Ii| ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The linear program above always has a polynomial num-
ber of variables, but potentially an exponential number of
constraints because of the condition ξ ∈ Ξ. However, in
two-player extensive-form games with no chance moves, (8)
is guaranteed to have a polynomial number of constraints
as Ξ can be described compactly (von Stengel & Forges,
2008). Hence, in those games a social-welfare-maximizing
NFCCE can be computed in polynomial time after setting
c :=
∑n
i=1 bi.
4. EFCCE: An Intermediate Solution
Concept
In this section, we introduce a new solution concept which
we coin extensive-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (EFCCE).
It combines the idea of coarse correlation—that is, play-
ers must decide whether they want to commit to following
the recommendations issued by the correlation device, be-
fore observing such recommendations—with the idea of
extensive-form correlation—that is, recommendations are
revealed incrementally as the players progress on the game
tree. Specifically, EFCCE is akin to EFCE in that each rec-
ommended move is only revealed when the players reach
the decision point for which the recommendation is rele-
vant. However, unlike EFCE, the acting player must choose
whether or not to commit to the recommended move before
such a move is revealed to them, instead of after. Each
choice is binding only with respect to the decision point
for which the choice is made, and players can make dif-
ferent choices at different decision points. Just like EFCE,
defections (that is, deciding to not commit to following
the correlation device’s recommended move) come at the
cost of future recommendations, as the correlation device
will stop issuing recommendations to the defecting player.
As with all correlated equilibria, the correlated distribution
from which the recommendations are sampled must be such
no player has incentives to unilaterally deviate when no
other player does.
4.1. Saddle-Point Formulation
In this section, we show that an EFCCE can also be ex-
pressed as the solution to a bilinear saddle-point problem.
To do so, we use the idea of trigger agents (Gordon et al.,
2008; Dudik & Gordon, 2009):
Definition 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a player, let Iˆ ∈ Ii be
an information set for Player i, and let µˆ be a probability
distribution over Πi(Iˆ). An (Iˆ , µˆ)-trigger agent for Player i
is a player that commits to and follows all recommendations
issued by the mediator until they reach a node v ∈ Iˆ (if any).
When any node v ∈ Iˆ is reached, the player ‘gets triggered’,
stops committing the recommendations and instead plays
according to a reduced-normal-form plan sampled from µˆ
until the game ends.
By definition, a correlated distribution µ over×ni=1 Πi is
an EFCCE when, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the value ui that
Player i obtains by following the recommendations is at
least as large as the expected utility uˆIˆ attained by any
(Iˆ , µˆ)-trigger agent for that player (assuming nobody else
deviates). The expected utility for Player i when everybody
commits to following the mediator’s recommendations is as
in Equation (3). In order to express the expected utility of
the (Iˆ , µˆ)-trigger agent, we start by computing the proba-
bility of the game ending in each possible leaf z ∈ Z. Let
(pi1, . . . , pin) be the tuple of reduced-normal-form plans that
was sampled by the mediator. Two cases must be distin-
guished:
• The path from the root to z passes through a node
v ∈ Iˆ . We denote the set of such leaves as ZIˆ . In
this case, the trigger agent commits to following all
recommendations until just before Iˆ , and then plays ac-
cording to a reduced-normal-form plan pˆi ∈ Πi(Iˆ) sam-
pled from the distribution µˆ from Iˆ onwards. Hence,
the following conditions are necessary and sufficient
for the game to terminate at z: pij ∈ Πj(z) for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}, pii ∈ Πi(Iˆ), and pˆi ∈ Πi(z).
Correspondingly, the probability that the game ends at
z ∈ ZIˆ is
pz :=
 ∑
pii∈Πi(Iˆ)
pij∈Πj(z) ∀j 6=i
µ(pi1, . . . , pin)

 ∑
pii∈Πi(z)
µˆ(pii)
.
(9)
• Otherwise, the trigger agent never gets triggered, and
instead commits to following all recommended moves
until the end of the game. The probability that the
5
ARXIV PREPRINT - AUGUST 28, 2019
game ends at z ∈ Z \ ZIˆ is therefore
qz :=
∑
pij∈Πj(z) ∀j
µ(pi1, . . . , pin). (10)
With this information, the expected utility of the (Iˆ , µˆ)-
trigger agent is computed as
uˆIˆ =
∑
z∈ZIˆ
ui(z) pz +
∑
z∈Z\ZIˆ
ui(z) qz.
Using to the definition of extensive-form correlation plan (2)
and sequence-form strategy (1), we can rewrite the condition
ui ≥ uˆIˆ (which must hold for all choices of i, Iˆ ∈ Ii and
probability distribution µˆ over Πi(Iˆ)) compactly as in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. An extensive-form correlation plan ξ ∈ Ξ
is an EFCCE if and only if the following inequality holds
for any player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, information set Iˆ ∈ Ii, and
sequence-form strategy yi,Iˆ ∈ Qi such that yi,Iˆ(σ(Iˆ)) = 1:∑
z∈ZIˆ
ui(z)ξi(σi(Iˆ); z)yi,Iˆ(σi(z))
≤
∑
z∈ZIˆ
ui(z)ξi(σi(z); z). (11)
Inequality (11) is again in the form ξ>Ai,Iˆyi,Iˆ − b>i,Iˆξ ≤
0 where Ai,Iˆ and bi,Iˆ are suitable matrices/vectors that
only depend on the trigger information set Iˆ of Player i.
From here, one can follow the same steps that we already
took in the case of NFCCE and obtain a bilinear saddle-
point formulation and a linear program for EFCCE. For
space reasons, we only state the linear program, which we
also implemented and tested (see Experimental Evaluation
section).
(12) :

max c>ξ
s.t. u− wi,Iˆ − v>i,Iˆfi + b>i,Iˆξ ≥ 0 ∀i, Iˆ ∈ Ii
F>i vi,Iˆ + wi,Iˆ −A>i,Iˆξ ≥ 0 ∀i, Iˆ ∈ Ii
u ≤ 0
ξ ∈ Ξ
u ∈ R, wi,Iˆ ∈ R,vi,Iˆ ∈ R|Ii| ∀i, Iˆ ∈ Ii.
The linear program (12) has a polynomial number of vari-
ables, and in two-player game with no chance it has also a
polynomial number of constraints because of the polynomial
description of Ξ (von Stengel & Forges, 2008). In particular,
in two-player games with no chance moves, a social-welfare-
maximizing EFCCE can be computed in polynomial time
by setting the objective function c>ξ to be the social welfare
c>ξ :=
∑
z∈Z
[(
n∑
i=1
ui(z)
)
ξ(σ1(z), . . . , σn(z))
]
.
Finally, we remark that the EFCCE linear program (12) has
more constraints and variables than NFCCE (see (8)), but
less than EFCE (see Supplemental Material). Empirically,
this results in intermediate run times compared to NFCCE
and EFCE, as confirmed by our experiments below.
4.2. Complexity Results
In this section, we discuss complexity results relating to the
problem of computing a social-welfare maximizing EFCCE.
As we have already pointed out, in the case of two-player
games without chance, the linear program in (12) has a
polynomial number of constraints and variables, and can
therefore be solved in polynomial time using standard LP
technology. We now point out that, as in NFCCE and EFCE,
the same does not hold in general for games with more
than two players and/or chance moves. In particular, the
following results can be easily obtained by using the same
reduction employed by von Stengel & Forges (2008):
Definition 2 (SWEFCCE(κ)). Given an extensive-form game
Γ and a real number κ, SWEFCCE(κ) denotes the problem
of deciding whether or not Γ admits an EFCCE with social
welfare at least κ.
Proposition 3. SWEFCCE(κ) is NP-Hard in two-player games
with chance moves.
Proposition 4. SWEFCCE(κ) is NP-Hard in three-player
games, with or without chance moves.
5. Relationships Between Equilibria
In this section, we analyze some relationships between
EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE. We start with the following
inclusion lemma, which shows that the solution concept that
we just introduced, EFCCE, is a superset of EFCE and a
subset of NFCCE (a proof of all propositions is available in
the Supplemental Material):
Proposition 5. Let Γ be a perfect-recall extensive-form
game. Then we have the following inclusion of equilibria
EFCE ⊆ EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE.
Proposition 5 applies to games with more than two players
and/or chance moves as well. Let UEFCE, UEFCCE, UNFCCE
denote the set of expected payoff vectors that can be induced
by EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE, respectively. Then, Propo-
sition 5 is an important ingredient for our next proposition:
Proposition 6. The sets UEFCE, UEFCCE, UNFCCE are convex
polytopes. Furthermore, UEFCE ⊆ UEFCCE ⊆ UNFCCE.
Proposition 5 also implies the following relationship be-
tween the maximum social welfare that can be obtained by
EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE:
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Figure 2. Space of payoff vectors that can be induced by EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE in an instance of the Sheriff game (left) and of
3-card Goofspiel (right). The ‘SW-optimal’ symbols indicate payoffs corresponding to social-welfare-maximizing equilibria.
Corollary 1. Let SW∗EFCE, SW
∗
EFCCE, SW
∗
NFCCE denote the
maximum social welfare that can be reached by EFCE,
EFCCE and NFCCE, respectively. Then, one has the in-
equality SW∗EFCE ≤ SW∗EFCCE ≤ SW∗NFCCE.
Figure 2 shows the set of payoff vectors that can be induced
by EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE in an instance of the Sheriff
game (Farina et al., 2019) (left) and an instance of a 3-
card Goofspiel game (Ross, 1971) (right). In the Sheriff
game instance, we have that both inclusions in Proposition 6
are strict, while in the Goofspiel game only the inclusion
UEFCE ( UEFCCE is strict, while UEFCCE = UNFCCE. The
appendix contains an instance of a Battleship game (Farina
et al., 2019) in which only the inclusion UEFCCE ( UNFCCE
is strict, while UEFCE = UEFCCE.
In the game of 2 (left) the inequalities between the values
of the maximum social welfare (Corollary 1) are both strict,
whereas in 2 (right) both inequalities are equalities.
6. Experimental Evaluation
We experimentally compare NFCCE, EFCCE and EFCE
both in terms of maximum social welfare and run time.
In our experiments, we use instances from three different
two-player games with no chance moves: Sheriff (Farina
et al., 2019), Battleship (Farina et al., 2019) and Goof-
spiel (Ross, 1971), whose full descriptions are available
in the Supplemental Material. Sheriff is a bargaining game,
in which two players—respectively, the Smuggler and the
Sheriff—must settle on an appropriate bribe so as to avoid
The polytopes of reachable payoffs were computed with the
help of Polymake, a tool for computational polyhedral geome-
try (Gawrilow & Joswig, 2000; Assarf et al., 2017).
the Sheriff inspecting the Smuggler’s cargo, which might or
might not contain illegal items. Battleship is a parametric
version of the classic board game, where two competing
fleets take turns at shooting at each other. Finally, Goofspiel
is a card game in which two players repeatedly bid to win
a common public card, which will be discarded in case of
bidding ties. The three games were chosen as to illustrate
three different applications in which an intermediate form
of centralized control (the correlation device) is beneficial:
bargaining in Sheriff, conflict resolution in Battleship, and
bidding in Goofspiel.
We used Gurobi 8.1.1 (Gurobi Optimization, 2019) to solve
the linear programs (8) for NFCCE, (12) for EFCCE, and (16)
for EFCE (the latter is given in the Supplemental Material).
We use the barrier algorithm without crossover, and we let
Gurobi automatically the recommended number of threads
for execution. All experiments were run on a 64-core ma-
chine with 512 GB of RAM.
Our experimental results are available in Table 1 for Bat-
tleship, Table 2 for Sheriff and Table 3 in the Supplemen-
tal Material for Goofspiel. Each table is split into three
parts. Part (a) contains information about the parame-
ters that were used to generate the game instances (refer
to the Supplemental Material for a detailed description of
their effects). It also shows the size of the instances in
terms of number of sequences pairs, defined as the product
|Σ1| × |Σ2| of the number of sequences of the players, and
number of relevant pairs of sequences (see Preliminaries
section). Part (b) compares the run times of our algorithm
(column ‘LP’). In the case of NFCCE, we also compare
against the only known polynomial-time algorithms to com-
pute social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE in extensive-form
games, which are both based on the column generation tech-
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Grid Rounds Seq. Pairs Rel. Seq.Size |Σ1| × |Σ2| Pairs
(2, 2) 2 6.795× 105 3.524× 104
(3, 2) 2 3.571× 106 2.645× 105
(3, 2) 3 7.209× 108 3.893× 106
(3, 2) 4 4.438× 1010 2.644× 107
(a) Instance parameters and dimensions
NFCCE EFCCE EFCE
LP CG-LP CG-MILP LP LP
358ms 30m 08s 24.78s 512ms 692ms
6.68s > 24h 3h 17m 2.67s 3.18s
1m 55s > 24h > 24h 3m 53s 12m 43s
25m 49s > 24h > 24h 1h 03m 2h 57m
(b) Run times of algorithms
NFCCE EFCCE EFCE
0 −2.100 −2.100
0 −1.270 −1.270
0 −1.500 −1.500
0 −1.955 −1.955
(c) Maximum social welfare
Table 1. Experimental results on several instances of the Battleship game.
nmax bmax r
Seq. Pairs Rel. Seq.
|Σ1| × |Σ2| Pairs
10 2 2 1.045× 104 3.717× 103
10 2 3 3.706× 105 3.363× 104
10 3 3 1.886× 106 9.577× 104
20 5 4 5.373× 109 1.326× 107
20 6 4 1.797× 1010 2.774× 107
20 7 4 5.131× 1010 5.277× 107
(a) Instance parameters and dimensions
NFCCE EFCCE EFCE
LP CG-LP CG-MILP LP LP
105ms 6m 17s 42.63s 250ms 311ms
1.03s 12h 52m > 24h 1.38s 2.14s
2.07s > 24h > 24h 2.44s 9.62s
13m 20s > 24h > 24h 1h 34m 6h 26m
2h 16m > 24h > 24h 5h 06m —
6h 32m > 24h > 24h 11h 59m oom
(b) Run times of algorithms
NFCCE EFCCE EFCE
13.64 9.565 9.078
13.64 10 10
18.18 15 15
28.57 25 25
33.33 30 —
38.10 35 —
(c) Maximum social welfare
Table 2. Experimental results on several instances of the Sheriff game. ‘oom’ means ‘Out of memory’.
nique, and have been introduced by Celli et al. (2019). In
particular, we implemented both the algorithm based on
a linear programming oracle, denoted ‘CG-LP’ in the ta-
bles, and the ‘more practical’ algorithm ‘CG-MILP’ based
on a mixed integer linear programming oracle that is pro-
posed by Celli et al. (2019) as a practically faster approach
for most applications. CG-LP is guaranteed to compute
a social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE in polynomial time,
whereas CG-MILP requires exponential time in the worst
case. Finally, Part (c) reports the value of the maximum
social welfare that can be attained by NFCCE, EFCCE and
EFCE.
6.1. Comparison of Run Time
As expected, increasing the coarseness of the equilibrium—
from EFCE to EFCCE to NFCCE—reduces the linear pro-
gram size which results in a smaller run time. Empirically,
the NFCCE linear program is up to four times faster than the
EFCCE linear program, and the EFCCE linear program is in
turn between two to four times faster than the EFCE linear
program. Furthermore, our results indicate that the NFCCE
linear program that we develop in (8) is two to four orders of
magnitude faster than CG-LP and CG-MILP, and it is able to
scale to game instances even up to five orders of magnitude
larger than CG-LP and CG-MILP can in 24 hours. We be-
lieve that this difference in performance is partly due to the
fact that the algorithms by Celli et al. (2019) have a number
of variables that scales with the total number |Σ1| × |Σ2|
of sequence pairs in the game, whereas our linear program-
ming formulation has a number of columns that grows with
the number of relevant sequence pairs, which is only a tiny
fraction of the total number of sequence pairs in practice.
6.2. Comparison of Maximum Social Welfare
Our results experimentally confirm Corollary 1: as the
coarseness of the equilibrium increases from EFCE to EFCCE
to NFCCE, so does the value of the maximum social welfare
that the mediator can induce. The maximum social welfare
attained by NFCCE is strictly larger than EFCCE and EFCE
in Battleship (Table 1) and Sheriff (Table 2), while it is the
same in Goofspiel (3 in the Supplemental Material).
Experimentally, the maximum social welfare that can be
obtained through EFCCE is often equal to the maximum so-
cial welfare that can be obtained through EFCE. While this
does not imply that the set of reachable payoffs is the same
(see Figure 2), it is an indication of the fact that EFCCE is
a tight relaxation of EFCE which can be solved up to four
times faster than EFCE in practice.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we studied two instantiations of the idea of
coarse correlation in extensive-form games: normal-form
coarse-correlated equilibrium and extensive-form coarse-
correlated equilibrium. For both solution concepts, we gave
saddle-point problem formulations and linear programs.
We proved that EFCCE, which we introduced for the first
time, is an intermediate solution concept between NFCCE
and the extensive-form correlated equilibrium introduced
by von Stengel & Forges (2008). In particular, the set of
payoffs that can be reached by EFCCE is always a superset
of those that can be reached by EFCE, and a subset of those
that can be reached by NFCCE. Empirically, EFCCE is a
tight relaxation of EFCE, and a social-welfare-maximizing
8
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EFCCE can be computed up to four times faster than EFCE.
This suggests that EFCCE could be a suitable and faster
alternative in algorithms that rely on EFCE, such as the al-
gorithm by Cˇerny` et al. (2018) in the context of Stackelberg
games.
Finally, we compared the run time of our algorithm for com-
puting social-welfare-maximizing NFCCEs, and showed
that it is two to four orders of magnitude faster than the only
previously known algorithms by Celli et al. (2019). Our al-
gorithm can also scale to game instances up to five orders of
magnitude larger than the prior state of the art, thus enabling
the computation of coarse-correlated solution concepts in
medium-sized extensive-form games for the first time.
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Supplemental Material
A. Formulation of EFCE
In this section, we show that an EFCE can also be expressed
as the solution to a bilinear saddle-point problem. To do
so, we resort again to the idea of trigger agents (Gordon
et al., 2008; Dudik & Gordon, 2009), slightly modifying the
definition of trigger agent that we have given in the section
about EFCCE to allow for deviations to happen after the
recommendations have been received:
Definition 3. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a player, let σˆ =
(Iˆ , aˆ) ∈ Σi be a sequence for Player i, and let µˆ be a
probability distribution over Πi(Iˆ). An (σˆ, µˆ)-trigger agent
for Player i is a player that follows all recommendations
issued by the mediator unless they get recommended to play
aˆ at information set Iˆ; if this happens, the player ‘gets trig-
gered’, stops following the recommendations and instead
plays according to a reduced-normal-form plan sampled
from µˆ until the game ends.
By definition, a correlated distribution µ over×ni=1 Πi is an
EFCE when, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the value ui that Player
i obtains by following the recommendations is at least as
large as the expected utility uˆσˆ attained by any (σˆ, µˆ)-trigger
agent for that player (assuming nobody else deviates). The
expected utility for Player i when everybody follows the
mediator’s recommendations is as in Equation (3). On the
other hand, the expected utility for the (σˆ, µˆ)-trigger agent
can be computed similarly to the one for the (Iˆ , µˆ)-trigger
agent that we have computed in the section of EFCCE. We
thus compute the probability of the game ending in any
terminal node z ∈ Z, this time distinguishing three cases:
• The path from the root to z includes playing action
aˆ at information set Iˆ . We denote the set of such
leaves as Zσˆ. In this case, the trigger agent follows
all recommendations until aˆ get recommended, and
then plays according to a reduced-normal-form plan
pˆi ∈ Πi(Iˆ) sampled from the distribution µˆ from Iˆ
onwards. To reach leaf z, however, we need to have
that the reduced-normal-form plan pˆi includes playing
aˆ at Iˆ . Hence, the following conditions are necessary
and sufficient for the game to terminate at z: pij ∈
Πj(z) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}, pii ∈ Πi(σˆ), and
pˆi ∈ Πi(z). Correspondingly, the probability that the
game ends at z ∈ Zσˆ is
pz :=
 ∑
pii∈Πi(σˆ)
pij∈Πj(z) ∀j 6=i
µ(pi1, . . . , pin)

 ∑
pii∈Πi(z)
µˆ(pii)
.
(13)
• The path from the root to z passes through informa-
tion set Iˆ but does not include playing action aˆ at Iˆ .
The game can end in this state both if the mediator
recommends all the players to play in order to reach
z, and thus the trigger agent never gets triggered, or
if the mediator recommends to play aˆ at Iˆ but then
the trigger agent deviates and plays according to the
reduced-normal-form plan pˆi ∈ Πi(z) sampled from
the distribution µˆ. Hence, the probability that the game
ends at z ∈ ZIˆ \Zσˆ is the sum of two terms, as follows:
qz :=
∑
pij∈Πj(z) ∀j
µ(pi1, . . . , pin)
+
 ∑
pii∈Πi(σˆ)
pij∈Πj(z) ∀j 6=i
µ(pi1, . . . , pin)

 ∑
pii∈Πi(z)
µˆ(pii)
.
• Otherwise, the trigger agent never gets triggered, and
instead followings all recommended moves until the
end of the game. The probability that the game ends at
z ∈ Z \ ZIˆ is therefore
rz :=
∑
pij∈Πj(z) ∀j
µ(pi1, . . . , pin). (14)
With this information, the expected utility of the (σˆ, µˆ)-
trigger agent is computed as
uˆσˆ =
∑
z∈Zσˆ
ui(z) pz +
∑
z∈ZIˆ\Zσˆ
ui(z) qz +
∑
z∈Z\ZIˆ
ui(z) rz.
By following the same steps that have already been taken
for NFCCE and EFCCE, one can now write the constraint
defining an EFCE in the following, compact way:
∑
z∈Zσˆ
ui(z)ξi(σˆ; z)yi,σˆ(σi(z))
≤
∑
z∈Zσˆ
ui(z)ξi(σi(z); z), (15)
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which needs to hold for all players i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and se-
quences σˆ ∈ Σi. Inequality (15) is in the form ξ>Ai,σˆyi,σˆ−
b>i,σˆξ ≤ 0 whereAi,σˆ and bi,σˆ are suitable matrices/vectors
that only depend on the trigger sequence σˆ of Player i. From
this formulation, one can obtain a linear program for com-
puting an EFCE optimizing over any linear function of ξ,
following the steps that we have outlined in the secion about
linear programming for NFCCE. We only give here the final
LP.
(16) :

max c>ξ
s.t. u− v>i,σˆfi − wσˆ + b>i,σˆξ ≥ 0 ∀i, σˆ∈Σi
Fi,
> vi,σˆ + wσˆ −A>i,σˆξ ≥ 0 ∀i, σˆ∈Σi
u ≤ 0
ξ ∈ Ξ
u ∈ R
wσˆ ∈ R,vi, σˆ ∈ R|Σi| ∀i, σˆ∈Σi.
B. Proofs
Proposition 5. Let Γ be a perfect-recall extensive-form
game. Then we have the following inclusion of equilibria
EFCE ⊆ EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE.
Proof. We break the proof into two parts, which can be read
independently.
EFCE ⊆ EFCCE Let ξ ∈ Ξ be an EFCE. We need to
show that, given any player i, decision point Iˆ ∈ Ii and
extensive-form strategy yIˆ ∈ Qi such that yIˆ(σi(I)) = 1,
Inequality (11) is satisfied. The crucial ingredient in the
proof is the fact that for any I ∈ Ii and z ∈ Z,
ξi(σi(I); z) =
∑
σi∈I
ξi(σi; z)
by definition of Ξ (2). Hence,∑
z∈ZIˆ
ui(z)ξ(σi(Iˆ), z)yIˆ(σi(z))
=
∑
z∈ZIˆ
∑
σˆ∈Iˆ
ui(z)ξi(σˆ; z)yIˆ(σi(z))
=
∑
σˆ∈Iˆ
∑
z∈ZIˆ
ui(z)ξi(σˆ; z)yIˆ(σi(z))
. (?)
Since ξ is an EFCE and yIˆ(σi(Iˆ)) = 1 by hypothesis, the
quantity in square brackets in (?) is upper bounded as in
Inequality (15). Hence we can write
(?) ≤
∑
σˆ∈Iˆ
∑
z∈Zσˆ
ui(z)ξi(σi(z); z)
=
∑
z∈ZIˆ
ui(z)ξi(σi(z); z),
where the second equality follows from the fact that the
collection of sets {Zσˆ}σˆ∈Iˆ forms a partition of ZIˆ . This
shows that Inequality (11) holds for any applicable choice
of player i, decision point Iˆ and deviation strategy yIˆ , and
therefore ξ is an EFCCE.
EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE Let ξ ∈ Ξ be an EFCCE. We need
to show that, for any player i and extensive-form deviation
strategy yi ∈ Qi, Inequality (4) is satisfied. To this end, let
I∗i be the set of initial decision points for the given player,
defined as all information sets that has an empty parent
sequence; in symbols, I∗i := {I ∈ Ii : σi(I) = ∅i}. The
collection of sets {ZI}I∈I∗i is a partition of the set of all
leaves Z. Hence, using the fact that σi(I) = ∅i for all
I ∈ I∗I : ∑
z∈Z
ui(z)ξi(∅i;σi(z))yi(σi(z))
=
∑
I∈I∗i
∑
z∈ZI
ui(z)ξi(∅i; z)yi(σi(z))
=
∑
I∈I∗i
∑
z∈ZI
ui(z)ξi(σi(I); z)yi(σi(z))
≤
∑
I∈I∗i
∑
z∈ZI
ui(z)ξi(σi(z); z)
=
∑
z∈Z
ui(z)ξi(σi(z); z),
where the inequality follows from Inequality (11), which is
applicable since ξ is an EFCCE by hypothesis, and y(σi(I)) =
y(∅i) = 1 by definition of Qi. This shows that Inequal-
ity (4) holds for any player i, and therefore ξ is an NFCCE.
Proposition 6. The sets UEFCE, UEFCCE, UNFCCE are convex
polytopes. Furthermore, UEFCE ⊆ UEFCCE ⊆ UNFCCE.
Proof. First, observe that the set of NFCCE is a convex
polytope, since it is the intersection of Ξ with Inequality 4
for all relevant instantiations (i.e., all players i in the case
of NFCCE). (Equivalent statements hold for EFCCE and
EFCE). Second, the function that maps a ξ ∈ Ξ to the tuple
of expected payoffs (one for each player) under the assump-
tions that players do not deviate from the recommendation
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strategy encoded by ξ, namely
ξ 7→

...∑
z∈Z ui(z)ξi(σi(z); z)
...

i∈{1,...,n}
,
is linear. Since the image of a convex polytope with respect
to a linear functions is a convex polytope, the first part of the
statement follows. The second part of the statement follows
trivially from Proposition 5.
Proposition 3. SWEFCCE(κ) is NP-Hard in two-player games
with chance moves.
Proof. Given a SAT instance (C, V ) in disjunctive normal
form, where C is the set of clauses and V the set of vari-
ables, we can build an extensive-form game as follows (see
Figure 3 for an example of such a game tree):
• at the start of the game, chance selects one action in the
set {aφ|φ ∈ C} uniformly at random, that is it picks
non-deterministically a clause in the SAT formula;
• each action aφ leads to a node hφ ∈ Iφ of Player
1, where he can choose an action to play in the set
{aφ,l|l ∈ φ}, that is it selects a literal in the clause φ;
• all actions aφ,l with l = v or l = v¯ for some v ∈ V
lead to node hφ,l ∈ Iv of Player 2, where he can choose
an action to play in the set {av, av¯}, that is it selects a
truth assignment for variable v;
• actions {av, av¯} lead to terminal nodes, where the
players receive utility (0, 0) if l = v and action av¯ was
played or if l = v¯ and action av was played, and they
receive utility (1, 1) otherwise.
If the SAT formula is satisfiable, this game admits a pure
Nash Equilibrium in which Player 2 plays the truth assign-
ment that satisfies it and Player 1 selects a satisfiable literal
for each clause; in this case, the expected utility for both
player is 1 and thus the social welfare is 2. If the SAT for-
mula is not satisfiable, then for any truth assignment there
exist at least one clause for which no literal can evaluate
to true, which means that any strategy profile will lead to
at least one (0, 0) outcome and thus the social welfare will
be strictly smaller than 2. Since any Nash Equilibrium is
trivially also an EFCCE, and since 2 is the optimal outcome
of the game, the pure Nash Equilibrium described above is
also an EFCCE. Hence, any polynomial time algorithm for
deciding whether it exists an EFCCE with social-welfare
greater than 2 could be employed to decide whether a SAT
formula is satisfiable or not.
Chance
Iφ1 Iφ2 Iφ3
Ix Iy
(0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1)
1
3
1
3
1
3
x¯ x xy y¯
x x¯ x x¯ x x¯ y y¯ y y¯
Figure 3. Two-player extensive-form game with Chance built from
the SAT instance C = {x¯, x ∨ y, x ∨ y¯}.
Proposition 4. SWEFCCE(κ) is NP-Hard in three-player
games, with or without chance moves.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for two players with
chance, with the only difference that we now have to employ
the introduction of a third player to simulate the random
chance move. This requires only a small modification in
the extensive-form game. In fact, it is sufficient to replace
the player at the root node with Player 3, that can choose
one action in the set {aφ|φ ∈ C}. The game then proceeds
unchanged, with Player 3 receiving as payoff 1− u1 where
u1 is the payoff received in the same terminal node by Player
1.
If the SAT formula is satisfiable, then the game admits
at least one Nash Equilibrium with a social welfare of 2.
Regardless of the strategy employed by Player 3, Player 1
can in fact always select one literal for each clause such that
they all evaluate to true under the truth assignment played
by Player 2. If the SAT formula is not satisfyable, then every
Nash Equilibrium has a social welfare strictly smaller than
2, as Player 3 is incentivized to play in a way as to reach
as many non-satisfiable clauses, after which no strategy of
Player 1 and 2 can get anything better than a social welfare
of 1. Thus, the same argument of the two player with chance
proof still holds, hence the SAT problem can be reduced to
the SWEFCCE(κ) one.
12
ARXIV PREPRINT - AUGUST 28, 2019
Num Ranks Seq. Pairs Rel. Seq. Pairs|Σ1| × |Σ2|
2 4.900× 101 3.700× 101
3 3.364× 103 6.640× 102
4 8.409× 105 1.793× 104
5 5.247× 108 6.772× 105
6 6.799× 1011 6.974× 106
(a) Instance parameters and dimensions
NFCCE EFCCE EFCE
LP CG-LP CG-MILP LP LP
27ms 86ms 167ms 18ms 17ms
26ms 6.83s 355ms 27ms 29ms
222ms 6m 06s 1m 42s 378ms 444ms
9.99s > 24h > 24h 14.50s 20.27s
14m 01s > 24h > 24h 42m 26s 1h 11m
(b) Run times of algorithms
NFCCE EFCCE EFCE
3 3 3
6 6 6
10 10 10
15 15 15
21 21 21
(c) Maximum social welfare
Table 3. Experimental results on several instances of the Goofspiel game.
C. Additional Figures
Payoff of Player 2
Payoff of Player 1
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SW-optimal NFCCE
Legend
EFCE
EFCCE
NFCCE
Figure 4. Payoff-space representation of a battleship game with
a 2 × 1 board, one ship per player and two rounds. In this case,
UEFCE = UEFCCE ( UNFCCE.
D. Game Instances Used in Our Experiments
For a detailed explanation of the games of Sheriff and Bat-
tleship, see the work by Farina et al. (2019) that introduced
them. In this section, we will only briefly review the most
important parameters that characterize them.
Where applicable, we will use the same symbols as Farina
et al. (2019) in the descriptions of the games below.
D.1. Sheriff
The Sheriff instances that we use in our experiments are
parametric over the maximum number nmax of illegal items
that the Smuggler can load in his or her cargo, the maximum
bribe bmax that can be offered to the Sheriff, and the number
of bargaining rounds r between the two players. Increas-
ing any of this parameters affects the size of the resulting
game instance. The other parameters of the game are set
to the fixed values v = 5, p = 1, s = 1 in all of our game
instances.
D.2. Battleship
Our instances of the Battleship game are parametric on the
grid size (w, h), and the maximum number of rounds r that
players have. The loss multiplier γ was set to the fixed
value 2 in all of our instances. Furthermore, each player has
exactly one ship of length 1 and value 1.
D.3. Goofspiel
The variant of Goofspiel (Ross, 1971) that we use in our
experiments is a two-player card game, employing three
identical decks of r cards each. At the beginning of the
game, each player receives one of the decks to use it as its
own hand, while the last deck is put face down between the
players, with cards in increasing order of rank from top to
bottom. Cards from this deck will be the prizes of the game.
In each round, the players privately select a card from their
hand as a bet to win the topmost card in the prize deck. The
selected cards are simultaneously revealed, and the highest
one wins the prize card. In case of a tie, the prize card is
discarded. Each prize card’s value is equal to its face value,
and at the end of the game the players’ score are computed
as the sum of the values of the prize cards they have won.
E. Additional Experimental Results
See Table 3 for experimental results on Goofspiel.
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